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I will discuss how animal laboratory research can be ethically ana-
lyzed using Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal 
rights. To accomplish this, I will not presuppose their strong ani-
mal rights framework. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s approach revolves 
around some basic human-animal relationships, reflecting the rela-
tional turn in applied ethics writ large. However, they do not discuss 
laboratory animal research in any detail, and so an extension to that 
domain of animal use is in order. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s empha-
sis on human-animal relationships is useful for reminding ourselves 
that in laboratories various staff or personnel can develop bonds with 
captive animals that make it difficult to follow certain protocols as 
well as create a deep and lasting negative impression. Though, when 
suitably modified, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory can 
apply to animal research ethics, it can only do so if we ask more from 
all members of our society.
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Introduction
The use of nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) in harm-
ful research or testing is an ongoing flashpoint in animal ethics 
(Knight 2011; Rollin 2012). Their use in invasive studies, particu-
larly those that cause, or are expected to cause, extreme pain or 
distress (CCAC 1991) give rise to profound moral difficulties (Rol-
lin 2009). Beyond these issues of direct harm, the housing condi-
tions (e.g., whether they are alone or in social housing), origins 
(e.g., captive breeding versus animal shelters or wild caught), and 
taxon identity (e.g., rodents versus domestic cats, domestic dogs, 
or macaques) of research animals are each associated with signifi-
cant moral issues (Orlans 2002; Schuppli, Fraser, and McDonald 
2004). Though it is not uncommon to have animal research ethics 
pay little attention to the moral significance of the species used 
(particularly if they are not apes) and pay even less attention to 
how odd this looks given the moral preeminence of one above all 
others ostensibly because of specific, morally significant, species-
typical though not unique capacities, a cursory understanding of 
the psychological capacities of nonhuman primates like macaques 
(Thierry 2011) or the depth of the bond that domestic cats can 
share with human care-givers (Bernstein 2007) suggest a compro-
mised moral compass. 
I will examine how Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s Zoo-
polean framework, most completely set out in Zoopolis: A Politi-
cal Theory of Animal Rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011), pro-
vides another opportunity to reset our compasses. Their approach 
revolves around some basic human-animal relationships (particu-
larly, those in our homes or communities), the importance of such 
relationships in the lives of many people who work hard to care 
for companion animals and advocate on behalf of various animals 
in captivity, and the potency of these relationships to give rise to 
positive duties. As Donaldson and Kymlicka note, animal rights 
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theories have typically emphasized negative duties but provided 
little guidance for those of us who take on care responsibilities for 
the animals in our lives. Their framework sets out to correct this 
lacuna (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
For reasons that will become clear in what follows, I will not be 
engaging Donaldson and Kymlicka’s unmodified framework. The 
next section will set out the parameters of my discussion, includ-
ing how I will engage their Zoopolean vision. I will focus on ani-
mal research ethics, particularly the intersection of positive rein-
forcement training and a dissent approach I have been developing 
in other work (though it will be compatible with the approaches 
taken in DeGrazia (2007) and Sapontzis (1987) and perhaps also 
Kantin and Wendler (2015)). I do so for several reasons. I suspect 
that some of the considerations that shape Donaldson and Kymlic-
ka’s discussions of our positive duties to other animals can help us 
re-envision how research animals are regarded or treated. Donald-
son and Kymlicka intentionally do not discuss laboratory animal 
research in any detail (e.g., see pp.43-44 of Donaldson and Kym-
licka (2011)), and so an extension to that domain of animal use is 
in order. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s emphasis on human-animal 
relationships is useful for reminding ourselves that in biomedical 
laboratories various staff or personnel can develop bonds with the 
animals for whom they care, and that this can make it difficult for 
them to follow certain protocols as well as deeply and negatively 
affect them (Coleman 2010; Iliff 2002). Cooperative animals are 
happier animals, and this can make a difference in the daily lives 
of laboratory staff and personnel. In the end I hope to show how a 
Zoopolean framework can apply to animal research ethics, though 
only if we ask more from all members of our society.
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Framing considerations
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework is based on a strong ani-
mal rights foundation and so requires a significant sea-change in 
commonly held moral views of other animals, if it is to be applied 
as they envision. However, they have suggested that their frame-
work can be useful to those who reject such a rights position (see 
p.21 of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011)) and I aim to explore that 
claim here. I adopt three other framing considerations, all taken 
from Zoopolis. First, revolutionary thought about human-animal 
relations, which foreground considerations of moral equality and 
inviolable rights, has had some impact on our various animal use 
practices but failed to garner widespread support. Presumably, 
appealing to attitudes and values that are already widely, though 
perhaps not yet universally, held is preferable. Second, as already 
mentioned, there are positive as well as negative duties to other 
animals of moral concern. Third, our various relationships with 
these animals determine our negative and positive duties (Donald-
son and Kymlicka 2011). 
As I will not assume a strong animal rights position in what fol-
lows, I will not assume that animals have such inviolable rights as 
a right to life, liberty, and a life free of torture. This is what allows 
me to explore the implications of a (diluted) Zoopolean framework 
for some areas of animal use rejected by Donaldson and Kymlic-
ka, including harmful research. As we will see, we must ask more 
of each other to usefully bring to bear such a framework. Never-
theless, I will indicate how these changes cohere with widely held 
attitudes or values.
For Donaldson and Kymlicka, most zoo conditions/settings 
and captive, including (presumably all) invasive, studies are mor-
ally impermissible (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). My position, 
which focuses on laboratory animal use, will be more permissive. 
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Though this claim can be easily overstated, there is public support 
for animal research, even where it harms the animals used (Ipsos 
MORI 2016; Joffe et al. 2016). Though a sound ethical framework 
is not decided by popular vote (we will return to that thought later), 
popular support is required for sustained, widespread changes in 
our relationships with other animals. 
That said, for the sake of this discussion I accept that animal 
research should be constrained by various ethical considerations. 
This is in step with current discussions of animal research eth-
ics commonly articulated through a commitment to the 3Rs of 
Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement and can be justified 
by a rather conservative commitment to avoiding unnecessary 
harm (Fenwick, Griffin, and Gauthier 2009). For our purposes 
here, Replacement prescribes replacing sentient animals with 
non-sentient models when such alternative models can be as ef-
fectively used, Reduction prescribes using the minimal numbers 
of animals needed in a given study to achieve statistically signifi-
cant results, and Refinement prescribes reducing or eliminating 
scientifically unnecessary or avoidable stress or distress (Prescott 
2017). Typically, what will qualify as scientifically necessary 
harm is determined by what is required to advance knowledge, 
practice, or safety (though the use of animals in pedagogical con-
texts in which they are, or have been, harmed is a contested area). 
I also accept that the 3Rs do not exhaust our ethical obligations 
to animals used, or the issues arising from their use, in research, 
teaching, or testing—a view championed by the likes of Orlans as 
well as Schuppli, Fraser, and McDonald (Orlans 2002; Schuppli, 
Fraser, and McDonald 2004). Issues not directly impacted by a 3R 
framework include transparency in disclosing negative as well as 
positive results arising from the use of particular animal models 
(for a dissenting view, see de Boo et al 2005), sourcing animals 
used in science, the typical permissibility of research associated 
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with extreme distress or suffering, and the use of certain species 
(e.g., macaques or domestic dogs) in research that harms them. 
As some of these considerations (e.g., greater transparency, stron-
ger restrictions on sourcing research animals, at least curtailing 
research causing extreme distress and suffering) can be justified 
by a relevantly similar conservative commitment to avoiding un-
necessary harm (Orlans 2002), I will consider these considerations 
to be as justified as the 3Rs. The issues surrounding the use of 
certain species will intersect with some of my later arguments.
Transitional animal research ethics
A number of animal bioethicists are pushing nonhuman pri-
mate research ethics in the direction of greater integration with 
human research ethics. Examples include efforts to defend a re-
seeing of nonhuman primates as vulnerable subjects (Johnson and 
Barnard (2014) focus primarily on chimpanzees), restricting pri-
mate research using appeals to minimal or slightly greater than 
minimal risk (Ferdowsian and Fuentes 2014), or foregrounding the 
dissent or consent capacities of the relevant nonhuman primates 
(Fenton 2012; 2014; Wendler 2014). Importantly for this discus-
sion, these efforts need not depend on revolutionary ethical com-
mitments. For example, a narrow moral gaze directed at the use of 
nonhuman primates in harmful research can be motivated by their 
phylogenetic proximity to humans. On sliding-scale views of mor-
al status, that appear to underwrite much of the animal research 
ethics used by proponents of animal research (Fenton 2012), there 
is a recognition that the more human-like other animals are, the 
more negative and positive duties accrue to those who use them 
in harmful ways (and, of course, vice versa) (DeGrazia 2002). 
A biological turn in understanding human psychological capaci-
ties, including those that are ethically relevant (e.g., sentience, 
self-awareness, intentional social engagement), can strengthen the 
relevant imperatives. Though there is much that is wrong-headed 
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in the typical sliding-scale approach (particularly, in light of the 
ethical irrelevancy of mere species identity (Andrews et al 2019), 
a point we will return to shortly), it reminds us that one can prob-
lematize the use of some animals in harmful research without im-
plications for all of the animals so used. Such a restricted inclusive 
ethics can permit a move forward in the use of animals in science 
(in the form of greater restrictions or curtailment) even within 
communities resistant to general nonhuman moral equality.
Efforts to push animal research ethics closer to its human coun-
terpart do not just promise a more positive outcome for the pri-
mates or other animals (Rollin 2012) so used. Those laboratory re-
searchers, staff, and technicians deeply concerned about the well-
being of the animals used in their laboratories will benefit from a 
framework that curtails the use of these subjects in ways that are 
distressing to witness, maintain, or execute. It is also well known 
that various laboratory stressors can affect the validity of the re-
sults gained from animal studies. A more humane space, in such 
circumstances, can yield better scientific results (Coleman 2010).
A fly in the ointment
All is not well (or good enough) in such approaches without 
modifying the background analyses of moral status. As an exam-
ple case, consider the use of positive reinforcement training (PRT) 
in laboratory settings. At first glance, PRT represents a signifi-
cant leap forward in the humane treatment of animals in research. 
What it seeks to secure is an animal’s cooperation and to avoid or 
reduce the use of negative reinforcement (NR), punishment, or re-
straints (Laule, Bloomsmith, and Schapiro 2003; Wolfensohn and 
Lloyd 2013).
PRT, as the name implies, makes use of rewards (positive re-
inforcers (PR)) to train animals to behave in desirable ways. This 
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contrasts with both NR and punishment. NR uses the introduc-
tion and timed removal (‘response-sensitive’ removal) of aversive 
stimuli or diminishment of aversive states (e.g., hunger or thirst) 
to train animals to behave in desirable ways. Punishment will also 
use aversive stimuli to train animals, but the punishment is di-
rected at animals who do not respond in desirable ways (Rennie 
and Buchanan-Smith 2006). 
Both reinforcement training approaches are superior to pun-
ishment for the primary reason that it is not an effective way to 
train another animal. Any cost-benefit analysis that uses the con-
servative commitment to avoiding unnecessary harm mentioned 
above, will, on this consideration alone, favor either PRT or nega-
tive reinforcement training (NRT). There are good reasons to fa-
vor the positive form, however. Imagine that PRT and NRT are 
equally effective (though for the record, PRT tends to be more ef-
fective (Wolfensohn and Lloyd 2013)). NRT, by its very nature, 
uses stressors to shape animal behavior. As stressors are in some 
sense harmful (Laule, Bloomsmith, and Schapiro 2003), PRT is to 
be favored on the conservative grounds mentioned above. What’s 
more, many laboratory animals can recognize individuals, so it is 
also reasonable to expect that individuals who are more readily 
associated with negative reinforcers will elicit stress responses. As 
being non-threatening to laboratory animals is an effective way to 
avoid unnecessary harm and can facilitate handling for such labo-
ratory procedures as injections, PRT should be preferred (Schuppli 
et al 2004). Since the nature of the relationships (e.g., whether they 
are caring or respectful) between laboratory researchers, staff, and 
technicians and the animals they use are integral to a Zoopolean 
framework (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011), favoring procedures 
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Donaldson and Kymlicka do not hold PRT in high regard and not 
merely because of their disapproval of harmful animal research. 
They see this type of training as essentially coercive (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011). Several reasonable considerations can be of-
fered in defense of their view. A more positive reward is likely to 
be more effective (e.g., keeping the animal’s attention, creating a 
more reliable motivation to behave in desirable ways) than a less 
positive reward. In other words, a more positive reward is a great-
er attractor. Particularly where there is no learning required for a 
stimulus to be rewarding (that is, the stimulus is innately attrac-
tive), purposefully using such a stimulus in reinforcement training 
takes on a manipulative appearance. Restraint, be it physical or 
chemical, and the use of negative reinforcers are options, for many 
personnel in laboratory settings, when animals fail to respond to 
positive reinforcers (Wolfensohn and Lloyd 2013). It is not clear 
whether the animals themselves must be aware that restraint or 
negative reinforcers come next for this context of use to take on a 
coercive ‘flavor.’ It may be enough that the animals recognize the 
stressors upon their presentation but before their use. The clincher 
is that the animals do not get to opt out of a procedure or study. 
They will be used, with or without their cooperation. 
Removing the fly
In previous work, I have been developing an argument for per-
mitting research animals to opt out of laboratory procedures or 
participation in laboratory studies. Borrowing a concept from pro-
gressive pediatric research ethics, I have defended the claim that 
intensely social cognitive animals like chimpanzees can dissent 
from research (Fenton 2014; see also Kantin and Wendler 2015). 
This claim is easily misunderstood. Unlike informed consent or 
even assent, an individual who dissents in the relevant way need 
not be able to think abstractly, understand the nature of research 
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or that it is not therapy, the risks involved, or that they have the 
freedom to withdraw at any time. The exemplar of a dissenting in-
dividual is a very young, neurotypical human child who is incon-
solable when faced with, or struggles to escape from, a research 
procedure such as a blood draw. Their sustained dissent – dissent 
that persists in spite of assurance or comfort – stops the labora-
tory procedure or precludes them from further participation in the 
relevant study, unless the procedure or study offers possible sig-
nificant benefits to the subject that are only available through par-
ticipation (Diekema 2006; Wendler 2006). I have suggested that 
the relevant dissent capacity of such a child consists in the capaci-
ties to feel distress, pain, or stress, to anticipate its future occur-
rence, and ‘ask’ that it stop “or express that the relevant distress, 
pain, or stress is unwanted” (Fenton 2014, p.134). According to our 
best current knowledge of intensely social cognitive animals like 
chimpanzees, macaques, and domestic dogs, they possess these 
capacities and so qualify as candidate dissenters (see Fenton 2014; 
Hau and Schapiro 2007; Stafford 2007). A recent case has been 
made for including all vertebrates, though it seems strongest for 
mammals and birds (Fenton and Shriver 2018). With a suitably 
adjusted background moral framework, such animals as chim-
panzees, macaques, and dogs can enjoy this protection extended 
to young human children if they express sustained dissent when 
faced with, or persist in struggling to escape from, a research pro-
cedure.
If dissent as I have described it is in play in contexts where an 
animal research subject has been trained to cooperate in research, 
then, should they persist in refusing to cooperate when facing a 
research procedure, it is not appropriate for laboratory staff or per-
sonnel to resort to either negative reinforcers or restraints. Given 
the considerations I canvassed above in favor of Donaldson’s and 
Kymlicka’s view that PRT is coercive, respecting the sustained 
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dissent of an intensely social cognitive research animal promises 
to morally rehabilitate the practice.
Of course, respecting the sustained dissent of animal research 
subjects does not follow from the conservative commitment to 
avoid unnecessary harm I mentioned earlier. To see this we need 
only recognize that neither the 3Rs nor such considerations as 
transparency of results or the curtailment of studies that cause 
extreme distress or suffering (e.g., medical testing), justified on 
this conservative commitment, undermine the priority of advanc-
ing scientific knowledge when pitted against interests of research 
animals to live free from distress, pain or stress. Even if my ap-
proach to dissent is understood to complement 3R approaches, the 
significance of a scientific study can override respecting dissent 
should doing so threaten the possibility of it starting or succeed-
ing. To adequately consider questions about the overall justifica-
tion of advancing scientific knowledge when using other animals, 
we need to be willing to depart from conservative animal research 
ethics. Appeals to cruelty and kindness, which might offer hope 
of remaining ethically conservative in this area of animal use, are 
not up for the job. As Rollin has pointed out time and again, it is 
a mistake to describe scientific research, even very invasive and 
painful research, as cruel (e.g., Rollin 2009). Cruelty minimally 
requires an indifference to suffering and the relevant scientific re-
search does not require indifference. Kindness can be reasonably 
understood to intersect with acting humanely and this brings us 
back to such ethical frameworks as the 3Rs.
The fundamental problem here is anthropocentric speciesism, 
as it supports the use of animals even when violating interests rel-
evantly similar to our own. A common contention in animal ethics 
is that anthropocentric speciesism is unjustified or, to put it less 
diplomatically, immoral. Defending the contention is relatively 
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straightforward. First, we have good human-related reasons to re-
ject it. Various reasonable commitments to women’s reproductive 
rights, including late term abortions (with or without the sanction 
of law), seem to run afoul of anthropocentric speciesism (Fenton 
2012). Second, reasonably strong views of the nature of ethics, 
seem to clinch it. DeGrazia’s thought experiments using now ex-
tinct earlier humans, such as Homo erectus or Homo floresiensis, 
remind us of the arbitrariness of favoring members of our own 
species (DeGrazia 2007). Thought experiments defending our 
duty to sapient extraterrestrials or artificial intelligence remind 
us that stopping at the ‘boundaries’ of our genus is not accept-
able (Carbone 2004). Though fraught with difficulties (Sapontzis 
1987), well crafted ‘burning hospital’ thought experiments should 
defend the judgment that, all other things being equal, it would 
be wrong to save an endangered frozen embryo over the hospital 
cat (be she sapient or not) from the inferno. The importance of a 
move away from anthropocentric speciesism does not stand or fall 
on sympathies with other animals around us. Arbitrariness is an-
tithetical to views of ethics as objective. Anthropocentric specie-
sism arbitrarily favors members of our species. If ethics is objec-
tive, we must reject this speciesism. 
There are cracks in the veneer of what one might be tempted to 
think is a widespread sympathy with anthropocentric speciesism 
outside the academy. Quite apart from support for reproductive 
rights, only benighted or misanthropic guardians of such com-
panion animals as cats and dogs adopt these animals in ignorance 
of, or indifference to, how their otherwise disposable income 
could be used to benefit other humans in need. Continued care 
for their nonhuman companions, particularly when, as is often 
the case with veterinary care, it is pricey, testifies to the moral 
weight of particular relationships over more abstract appeals to 
human solidarity (Gruen 2011). Rather than this being a failure of 
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moral agency, it can be understood to reflect the substantive com-
mitment of these guardians to the animals they adopt. Arguably, 
no one should adopt such animals without this commitment as, if 
they did, it is difficult to see how these animals would receive ad-
equate care. Such a failure would violate even a conservative com-
mitment to avoid unnecessary harm. Importantly for my purposes 
here, it is difficult to see how a decision to so care for an animal 
can cohere with the commitments of a reflective anthropocentric 
speciesist.
A non-anthropocentric speciesist framework is not as radical 
as it may sound. Various members of human communities can 
enjoy priority over other (though not all other) animals without be-
ing speciesist. Human exceptionalism is an unsuccessful attempt 
to defend this view. Proponents favor ethical analyses that fore-
ground psychological capacities thought to be uniquely human 
as necessary for the moral status many humans currently enjoy 
(Livingstone Smith 2013). It encounters problems for two reasons: 
the humans it seeks to protect, and our best knowledge of the ca-
pacities of some other animals. As long as human exceptional-
ism seeks to prioritize the interests of all humans from birth to 
death, as many proponents are inclined to do, it seems to fall vic-
tim to arbitrariness. This is not to say that this kind of anthropo-
centricism has been a wholly bad thing. Anthropocentricism has 
helped ableists see the ethically significant capacities possessed by 
neuroatypical individuals. Once so attuned, we see the palpable 
results: the preferences of neuroatypical individuals have been 
enjoying increasing significance in how our shared spaces are de-
signed or maintained. That said, such anthropocentricism ignores 
morally significant capacities possessed by other animals and so 
violates formal justice (where like should be regarded alike). That 
other animals should matter under an inclusive moral framework 
(that is, a framework that moves beyond restricting moral consid-
Andrew Fenton
144
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
erablility to those possessing complex cognitive capacities (e.g., 
an ability to reason abstractly, master a natural language)) should 
not be surprising. If all living humans are morally considerable, 
then it is likely that the relevant capacities will range over a wide 
variety of cognitive capacities relevant to the emergence of vari-
ous conscious states or levels of awareness (from, say, an aware-
ness of, and readiness to engage, the surrounding world through 
to self-awareness). It should take little convincing to point out rel-
evantly similar, or equally significant, capacities among animals 
like chimpanzees or macaques (see some of the references already 
cited). This reflects not only the work of such primatologists as 
Jane Goodall (e.g., Goodall 1988) and Frans de Waal (e.g., de Waal 
1990), but the success of disseminating their findings through pop-
ular media. Much the same can be said for many other mammals, 
birds, and perhaps fish (Andrews 2015; Fenton and Shriver 2018). 
Once these similar, or equally significant, psychological capaci-
ties are recognized, the arbitrariness of prioritizing only humans 
is apparent (Taylor 2011). Note, however, that a rejection of human 
exceptionalism does not “open the flood gates.” Though such ani-
mals as chimpanzees or macaques can enjoy new prominence in 
a non-anthropocentric moral framework, it is unclear how many 
other animals will or should. Much will depend on what capacities 
are taken to matter ethically.
For the sake of my overall argument, it is not necessary to settle 
that issue. A rejection of anthropocentric speciesism and human 
exceptionalism can add significant weight to the sustained dis-
sent of animals like chimpanzees or macaques. Without further, 
non-arbitrary considerations to preclude this re-weighting, and I 
know of none that do not fall afoul of the proper regard due diverse 
members of our own communities, we can re-enter the main dis-
cussion where I concluded that PRT need not be coercive.
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More on transitions
My focus on laboratory animals precludes using, at least un-
modified, the citizenship-related categories of Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s Zoopolean framework (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011). There are three: co-citizenship, denizenship, and status as 
a sovereign nation. Co-citizenship is directed at animals who we 
have brought into our societies, gradually changed to better fit 
their circumstances and our needs, and made dependent on our 
care and humane treatment. Denizenship is directed at animals 
who ‘choose’ to live, or remain, in proximity to human homes, 
towns, and cities. They are not, or are no longer, domesticated 
and either not dependent or differently dependent on us (e.g., they 
may depend on our waste rather than direct feeding or provision 
of shelter). The status of a sovereign nation is directed at popula-
tions of free-living animals who tend to avoid human presence 
and occupy discrete territories. Though each category assumes a 
shared set of negative duties that seek to protect the lives and gen-
eral welfare of sentient animals, they also have distinct positive 
duties fixed by the nature of the relationship between animals and 
humans. Co-citizenship, for example, brings with it positive duties 
of care, to properly socialize, and accommodate the relevant ani-
mals’ interests in how we run or design our societies. Denizenship 
brings with it duties to ensure co-existence, including the design 
of spaces geared toward the accommodation of particular basic 
needs of survival. Recognizing populations of free-living ani-
mals as sovereign carries duties of respect directed at territorial 
boundaries or resources within said territories as well as efforts 
to protect the independent functioning of the relevant nonhuman 
communities (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
Clearly, neither the status of sovereign-nation nor denizen apply 
to populations of laboratory animals. Such populations are neither 
free to live independent of human presence nor do they seek out 
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human habitation. Co-citizens, at least as they are understood post 
the forty year Tuskegee syphilis study (Jones 2008), the Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital scandal in New York (Arras 2008), or 
the mid-century nutrition studies at Canadian residential schools 
(Mosby 2013), should not be intentionally endangered or seriously 
harmed, nor should the expression of their agency be unnecessar-
ily curtailed. As it currently stands, research animals are not treat-
ed as co-citizens and, without a radical re-framing of our moral 
frameworks in ways that reflect a strong non-anthropocentric 
stance, that is unlikely to change any time soon. 
Sanctuaried (‘retired’) or rehomed research animals are inter-
esting exceptions. Though the chimpanzees retired (or to be re-
tired) from research in the US are benefiting from several factors 
(e.g., advances in alternative models, failures of chimpanzee mod-
els, reclassification as an endangered species (NIH 2013; Collins 
2015)), this was not a victory for animal rights so much as a con-
sistent application of 3R-based policy. It was, after all, the lack of 
the necessity of chimpanzee models to advance the biomedical 
sciences, rather than any special status accorded these nonhuman 
great apes, that played the central role in their retirement (Kahn 
2014). Importantly for this discussion, it looks as though, once 
retired, these chimpanzees will not, at any future time, re-enter 
research. Rehomed research animals who are no longer useful to 
research but are not euthanized, such as some domestic cats and 
dogs, find retirement as companion animals (Yeager 2018). Again, 
these animals are unlikely to re-enter research. Together, these an-
imals have moved from a status unclassified within an undiluted 
Zoopolean framework (or at least a status like captive or prisoner) 
to something resembling co-citizenship status. In each case, the 
preferences of the individuals take on much greater significance 
and can inform the shape of their new physical and social environ-
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ments (including the terms or conditions of their interactions with 
humans). 
Of the positive categories used by Donaldson and Kymlicka, 
co-citizenship is the least dissimilar to the actual conditions of ex-
istence experienced by research animals. Indeed, some elements 
of Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s co-citizenship status can apply 
to some research animals in contexts where their interests are no 
longer assessed through an anthropocentric lens. Intensely social 
cognitive animals possessing the capacities that mark them as can-
didate dissenters should enjoy certain protections. If we are com-
mitted to meaningfully respecting the dissent capacity of these 
research animals, care must be taken not to destroy it, preclude its 
re-acquisition when lost, or fail to protect its emergence among the 
young (Fenton 2018). This places even greater importance on en-
richment efforts that are increasingly standard in North American 
laboratories. This can be re-seen as a re-shaping of research envi-
ronments to reflect the needs and preferences of research animals. 
PRT also takes on greater significance, as a protective measure 
that helps research animals deal with laboratory stressors. Such a 
protective measure complements enrichment efforts to offset the 
otherwise damaging effects of this kind of captivity. What’s more, 
PRT can be re-seen as a form of socialization that helps these re-
search animals better fit their captivity. Respecting the dissent of 
animals trained with PR deepens the ways in which their prefer-
ences positively affect their laboratory environments. So under-
stood, there will be an increasing resemblance of this context of 
use to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s co-citizenship category.
Conclusions
Where has this journey taken us? I have explored a diluted 
Zoopolean framework with a particular focus on research ani-
mals. This was in part to see whether such a framework can avoid 
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adopting a strong animal rights position, as Donaldson and Kym-
licka contend, and also to see how such a framework intersects 
with a controversial but largely socially acceptable use of animals 
that does not fit Donaldson and Kymlicka’s undiluted approach. 
I have suggested that certain laboratory practices, in particular 
PRT when coupled with my dissent approach, holds out hope of 
changing laboratory settings in ways that resemble Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s category of co-citizenship, though only when the mor-
al frameworks governing our use of research animals are purged 
of anthropocentric biases. Perhaps this shows in a small way how 
a diluted Zoopolean framework can serve as an intermediary be-
tween the status quo and an undiluted Zoopolis, where sentient 
animals enjoy lives free of unwanted human presence and anthro-
pogenic suffering. 
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